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Maintaining the highest quality all-volunteer Army serves a vital national interest; therefore, systems should be in place for it to become a national effort. This process begins with the Army's deep reflection, followed by its willingness to change its organizational culture. The Army may find itself suited to adopt a marketing culture while maintaining its warfighting edge. Such a transformation might also help the Army establish deeper relationships with the society and nation it serves. This paper will explore the challenges of Army marketing in an environment of increasing fiscal austerity, and recommend an innovative strategy that incorporates a comprehensive approach to achieve national unity of effort.
We Want You: It Takes a Village
To Market the Army I would encourage you and all young Americans, especially those at the most selective universities who may not have considered the military, to do so.
-Dr. Robert M. Gates 1 Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates' call to action at Duke University challenged the aspirations of many young Americans; for amongst them, the propensity to consider military service as a career option continues to steadily decline. 2 Despite
Army advertising efforts to portray its tangible benefits for volunteering such as money for education, enlistment bonuses, and career opportunities; and intangible ones of service to country, honor, and pride, 3 an ever-increasing number of the nation's youth see serving in the military as "something for other people to do." 4 Since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force, the Army's marketing strategy has assumed sufficient numbers of eligible youth would show the propensity to serve and volunteer. It has also assumed that adequate resources would be dedicated to marketing and recruiting efforts. In the face of the continued pace of declining propensity, and the Army's consideration for a massive reduction to its advertising budget, 5 these assumptions no longer hold. Thus, the Army might need a new strategy, one that begins with truly open-minded reflection, followed by bold and innovative changes to its own organizational culture, and ultimately leverages opportunities in today's environment to reach and attract the nation's youth.
How does the Army effectively market itself in an era of long-term fiscal
austerity? The Army's traditional approaches to addressing marketing and recruiting challenges have been to adjust its traditional marketing levers -the size of its recruiting force, the degree to which it can offer financial incentives to prospective candidates, and 2 the sum total of its advertising budget. 6 The Army can no longer assume sufficient propensity to serve and must take a more active role as an enterprise in engaging youth, such as in the example given by the former Defense Secretary. Enacting this new behavior requires the Army to challenge its attitudes and beliefs and develop new values, norms, and traditions throughout its organizational culture. 7 From its visible and most accessible manifestations of culture, its artifacts such as separate organizations and careers, to its unobservable and deepest layers of underlying assumptions and norms and values, 8 the Army's use of dedicated resources has resulted in an institutionwide culture that views marketing and recruiting as functions separate from warfighting, training, sustaining, and all other unit activities.
To adopt a marketing orientation while maintaining its warfighting edge, Army culture should adopt norms and values that focus all of its activities at two distinct groups of stakeholders 9 -a nation of citizens who depend on their Army to deter and defeat aggression, and fight and win their nation's wars; and a nation of future Army prospects, influencers, and advocates. For an Army accustomed to focusing on the former, shifting to include such a prominent marketing orientation would require the involvement, dedication, and complete commitment of the entire organization.
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Change begins with the Army expecting the entire institution to actively participate in all of its marketing efforts. It continues with the organization's collective energies to exhibit the "strength of the nation," 11 and connect the Army to its nation's citizenry in pioneering and cost-effective ways. Finally, the Army should eye far beyond itself, and leverage perhaps the most important driver towards raising the propensity to 3 serve, our "nation of advocates" 12 -our nation's citizens, our communities, and even the private sector. In other words, it will take a village to market the Army.
How the Army Currently Markets Itself
The Army defines the organizational function of marketing as "a set of processes for creating, communicating, and delivering value to customers and for managing customer relationships in ways that benefit the organization and its stakeholders." 13 Drawing from Narver, Slater, and Tietje (1998) and Deshpande and Webster (1989) , marketing culture is the "values, norms, means and behavior, which characterizes the individuality of the organization" and its commitment "to the continuous creation of superior value for customers." 14 This definition of marketing culture applies to the entire organization, who may (as the Army has) or may not choose to separate marketing efforts from all other activities. Marketing stands for much more than branding, slogans, and advertising; it encompasses an organization's comprehensive commitment to maintain its identity and ensure its survival. The Army does the former, but less so the latter.
Army recruiting stands for a great deal more than a human resource action of engaging, encouraging, and selecting suitable candidates for filling its ranks. Certain aspects of recruiting are inseparably connected to the communicative side of marketing.
Meeting the tenets of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command's (2010) strategic plan of building "independent yet interconnected relationships with families and communities across the nation" 15 
Underlying Assumptions
The Army's existing marketing culture stems from three fundamental underlying assumptions that are worth reviewing. First, the Army sees marketing as a collateral duty, not one of its core functions, and therefore does not view marketing activities as a priority for the rank and file. Second, the Army's preference for complete control over its marketing activities makes it reticent to outsource them; it desires to accomplish the marketing function primarily on its own. Finally, the Army assumes that it must be in complete control of its brand. I will explore each of these assumptions to show how they manifest themselves in the norms of the Army's marketing culture and why they must be challenged.
Marketing as a Collateral Duty, Not a Core Function
The responsibility for promoting Army service as a career of choice for America's youth 25 exists within a small and segregated niche group of accessions organizations. connections. These artifacts demonstrate the Army's self-view of the depth of its roots and trust with its nation's citizens, which are both very important matters of Army belief. 33 The Army believes that, "People around the world recognize the American 
The Army Must Be in Control
Army policy prohibits any endorsement or the appearance of endorsement to any commercial firm or product. 37 This standard manifests itself in the Army's tight controls over its marketing activities. While policy governs Army behavior, principles of marketing shape it as well.
In marketing, the brand should aspire to represent and convey the distinctive identity associated with the product, organization, or symbol. 38 The Army Marketing and
Research Group defines a brand as, "a customer experience represented by a collection of images and ideas; often, it refers to a symbol such as a name, logo, slogan, and design scheme." 39 A brand represents a promise; 40 it elicits a visceral response. 41 To the Army, its brand embodies its product, the reputation of value for its experience, 42 through its symbol of the Army star, messages, and images conveyed through advertising. The Army brand aspires to be exclusively identified with "strength." 43 Gaining "strength for lifetime success" 44 and inspiring strength in others represent the distinct benefits, or value proposition, 45 it promises. Accordingly, for its brand to maintain this distinguishable value, the Army carefully manages it.
The Army Marketing and Research Group (2012) recommended several control measures for the Army's brand to senior Army leaders. It advised guarding against any dilution, substitution, and alteration of the brand; building of brand equity through branding "one Army with one brand;" and emphasizing consistent branding and messaging from every platform. 46 These recommendations demonstrate the Army's discomfort with the prospect of loaning its brand to others; however, long-term fiscal austerity might warrant doing so. Tight controls, when combined with diminishing resources, risk the Army falling behind in staying connected with America's youth.
Embracing a Different Marketing Culture
With the current marketing environment no longer able to support sustaining the cultural status quo, the Army should embrace a different marketing culture with new underlying assumptions, norms, and values. 47 Reinforcing the resulting shared norms and values might encourage innovative activities and behavior that would manifest itself in the Army's creation of new artifacts. 48 It might also promote the use of existing visible symbols of Army culture in pioneering ways. The foundation of the proposed marketing culture comprises three different underlying assumptions, explained below.
Marketing as a Core Function
Army strategic direction, shaped by US law, DoD policy, and the nature of landpower, drives the Army's mission, 49 roles, and core functions. Therefore, at its organizational culture perspective, the Army views landpower as its product. However, a marketing culture perspective would also perceive the Army's product to be its experience. 50 To adopt the assumption of marketing's fundamental role requires the use of embedding mechanisms, which "emplace assumptions in an organization." 51 
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The Army's promotion and command selection board processes might also serve to embed assumptions of marketing's importance. Adopting a command selection policy similar to that of US Marine Corps, which considers selection for command in recruiting as a unique distinction for one of its most demanding missions, 61 might serve to instill a notion of equal preference for all types of commands. Correspondingly, promotion and selection board guidance should direct board members to equally consider operational and institutional unit assignments.
Rewards and Status
The Army links much of its allocation of rewards and status to its personnel actions. Therefore, institutionalizing the above personnel policies and other actions should bring commensurate emphasis on the importance of considering marketing as a core function. For example, implementing the award of SIs and ASIs should convey status and be required for promotion of general officers and sergeants major.
In a manner similar to the implementation of joint officer management through the joint qualification system, 62 the Army should establish similar qualification criteria to uphold career progression that recognizes marketing's significance. This line of thinking includes ensuring that officers serving as general officers and noncommissioned officers serving as sergeants major have the requisite experience and training to be highly proficient in communicating the Army's superior value to its nation's citizens. This mechanism also aims to prevent the Army's operational focus from allowing its leaders and personnel to lose sight of their roles of sustaining an all-volunteer force in a democracy. 63 The Army should also consider marketing experiences retroactively and award constructive credit for marketing experiences.
14 Emphasis on the importance of marketing activities might also be embedded through mandatory comments in evaluation reports and consideration for promotion and schooling. 64 Gerras, Wong, and Allen assert that the power of these mechanisms "cannot be overstated." 65 For instance, successful completion of recruiting command in the Marine Corps results in follow-on attendance at highly-selective professional military schools without being subjected to a school selection board. 66 Marketing By, With, and Through Others
When contemplating a life-changing decision such as joining the Army, the "first handshake" might not necessarily come from a Soldier. When making significant choices, prospects often look to the advice of their most trusted mentors. 67 These influencers include a network of parents, teachers, guidance counselors and other role models. 68 Within the majority of these circles of trust, very few have individuals with military experience. As time passes, the number of these circles containing anyone with military service will continue to decline. 69 
Willingness to Cede a Degree of Control
In the face of long-term fiscal austerity, the Army might reconsider its policy of total control of its brand and embrace a third bold and daring underlying assumption.
This notion calls for its willingness to cede a degree of control in order to "get more in Before proceeding, the Army must identify private sector partners who exemplify a shared set of values, beliefs, and norms. They must also possess a strong and trusted reputation within America. Correspondingly, the potential partner must feel that assisting the Army aligns with its own mission, values, and philosophy. 94 It must also be willing to formally agree to publicly advocate for the superior value of Army service.
Public advocacy for Army service offers additional potential benefits to the private sector. It stands out as a "socially responsible business practice." 95 Open and visible 21 support to a trusted organization with a strong reputation such as the all-volunteer Army may also increase the pride that individuals have in their business. 96 If the Army becomes willing to loan its brand and message, it stands to gain as well. Through cooperation, the Army may achieve increased market presence accompanied by strengthened brand and brand statement 97 positioning. These effects help gain heightened awareness of the Army as a prominent career choice.
After serving, Army personnel inevitably return to the nation's communities and the private sector. This reality enables these veterans to convey and demonstrate that their service made them physically, mentally, and emotionally stronger. Their personification of the Army's promise, its brand, enables spreading the message to prospective candidates that "being a soldier strengthens you today and for the future."
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This message may also be strengthened, but it will take a village -a network of Soldiers, veterans, communities, and even the private sector -to market the Army.
Conclusion
Maintaining the highest quality all-volunteer Army serves a vital national interest; therefore, systems should be in place for it to become a national effort. The first step in creating this vision should start with the Army's earnest reflection. Embracing an enterprise-wide marketing culture would not sacrifice its ability to meet its landpower obligations to the nation. This organizational culture transformation would require the use of leader-driven internal embedding mechanisms such as role-modeling, personnel policies, and rewards and status to change its deeply-rooted underlying assumptions pertaining to marketing. It continues with the expansion of its network-centric, grassroots community marketing strategy with the goal of adopting this effort Armywide. Finally, the Army's willingness to loan its brand in prudent ways to carefully selected private sector partners might generate greater marketing power through revolutionary unified Army marketing campaigns.
This effort would spark a new marketing approach amongst the total force, willing advocates amongst our citizens, and Army veterans in prominent positions in the public and private sector. Achieving unity of effort would enhance the overall effectiveness of the Army's marketing activities. More importantly, it would enable this core function to withstand future fiscal uncertainties.
As a volunteer, mission-focused, and values-based organization, entrusted with the responsibility to perform the nation's most important missions in support of its vital interests, the Army finds itself well-suited to maintain the trust of its nation's individual citizens. In turn, this trust provides opportunity for marketing Army service as a groundbreaking cohesive effort between the Army, the public, and the private sector.
Collectively, this powerful team could convey a strong message in encouraging those contemplating Army service that, "We want YOU to be a soldier today; OUR future will be better for it." Endnotes
